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Abstract—Location information claimed by devices will play
an ever-increasing role in future wireless networks such as
5G, the Internet of Things (IoT). Against this background,
the verification of such claimed location information will be
an issue of growing importance. A formal information-theoretic
Location Verification System (LVS) can address this issue to
some extent, but such a system usually operates within the
limits of idealistic assumptions on a-priori information on the
proportion of genuine users in the field. In this work we
address this critical limitation by using a Neural Network (NN)
showing how such a NN based LVS is capable of efficiently
functioning even when the proportion of genuine users is
completely unknown a-priori. We demonstrate the improved
performance of this new form of LVS based on Time of Arrival
measurements from multiple verifying base stations within the
context of vehicular networks, quantifying how our NN-LVS
outperforms the stand-alone information-theoretic LVS in a
range of anticipated real-world conditions. We also show the
efficient performance for the NN-LVS when the users’ signals
have added Non-Line-of-Site (NLoS) bias in them. This new
LVS can be applied to a range of location-centric applications
within the domain of the IoT.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are at the verge of new wireless networks that aim to
bring communication revolutions in homes, hospitals, edu-
cation, transportation, and other aspects of society. Emerg-
ing Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) are particularly
exciting due to their potential to save many lives. The
success of these new technologies in general, and ITS in
particular, find their roots in the true location information
of the clients (devices, users, vehicles) involved. In many
scenarios it is anticipated that clients can directly obtain their
location information [1], [2] through the Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS). This location information is then
usually provided by the clients to other clients or to some
central Processing Center (PC), for verification and other
network functionality purposes. But what if a client provides
incorrect information about its true location intentionally in
an attempt to obtain some advantage over other users [3],
[4]? Such circumstances could also occur unintentionally due
to difficulty in recording the GNSS location information or
faulty hardware issues.
The focus of the work in this paper is location verification
in the Internet of Things (IoT), in general, and in ITS (a sub-
application of IoT) in particular. The location verification
framework proposed in this work is applicable to all IoT
applications whose performance is related to a user’s reported
location. Within ITS, if a malicious user provides inaccurate
location information and this goes unnoticed, the possible
aftermath could range from sub-optimal traffic routing all the
way through to life-threatening collisions [5], [6]. Verification
of a user’s reported location information is hence critical
for successful operation in ITS [5], [7]–[10]. Due to this,
Location Verification System (LVS) performance has been
a research focus in ITS for well over a decade. Recently,
several information-theoretic LVSs have been devised [11]–
[13]. These LVSs operate under a set of well-defined rules
and conditions. Additionally, they have limitations in address-
ing various anomalies since they usually assume idealized
channel conditions [11]. As such, information-theoretic LVSs
usually possess performance limitations in real-world situa-
tions. One of the most important of these limitations is the
a-priori lack of knowledge on the proportion (fraction) of
vehicles in the field that will be malicious (alternatively, the
fraction that will be genuine).
Neural Networks (NNs) have recently brought break-
throughs into many aspects of modern society. Web mining
[14], content filtering [15], image recognition [16], [17],
speech processing [18], language identification [19], speaker
verification [20], object detection [21], [22], advanced ge-
nomics [23], and drug discovery [24] are just a few of
the fields impacted. NNs also lay the foundation for many
aspects of the self-driving car paradigm [25]. Many of these
breakthroughs are achieved through the development of new
NN algorithms [26].
We consider an LVS based on Time of Arrival (ToA)
measurements [27] under the influence of Non-Line-of-Sight
(NLoS) biases. The novel contributions in this work are
summarized below.
• We show that the NN-LVS proposed in this work
outperforms an information-theoretic LVS [27] when the
ToA of the users’ signals have added NLoS bias in them.
• We also show that unlike the information-theoretic LVS
which assumes an a-priori knowledge about the pro-
portion of malicious vehicles in the field, the NN-LVS
works satisfactorily in the complete absence of this
knowledge.
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Recent advancements in digital signal processing and hard-
ware design now provide us with very accurate physical-layer
timing information for wireless networks [28], [29]. These
developments provide us with the clock synchronization that
enables the LVS we study here. As such, we suggest our
new NN-LVS can offer a viable and pragmatic solution to
the important task of location verification for many IoT
applications under real-world conditions and uncertainties.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes the system model. Section III details
the performance analysis using information theory and neu-
ral network techniques. Section IV provides the numerical
results, and Section V highlights future prospects. Section
VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We outline the system model and assumptions considered
for our framework:
1) The framework consists of N trusted Base Stations
(BSs) as verifiers with publicly known locations that
are assumed to be in the range of the prover (the
vehicle whose claimed location is to be authenticated).
The location of the i-th BS is Xi = [xi, yi] where
i = 1, 2, ..., N .
2) The true location from a genuine or malicious vehicle
(the prover) is denoted byXt = [xt, yt] and is assumed
to possess zero localization error.
3) We refer to the announced (reported) location from a
legitimate or malicious vehicle as claimed location and
denote it by Xc = [xc, yc]. For a legitimate vehicle,
the claimed location is exactly the same as its true
location. On the other hand, a malicious vehicle spoofs
its true location to the BSs (to potentially obtain an
advantage over other vehicles or to disrupt the system
performance). The true location of a malicious vehicle
is unknown to the wider network.
4) One of the N BSs is chosen as the PC. Measurements
from all BSs are collected at the PC before being
processed into a a binary decision related to a vehicle’s
claimed location.
5) Under the null hypothesis Ho, the framework assumes
a vehicle to be legitimate, i.e.,
Ho : Xc = Xt. (1)
6) Under the alternate hypothesis H1, the framework
considers a vehicle to be malicious, i.e.,
H1 : Xc 6= Xt. (2)
Under Ho, the ToA value measured by the i-th BS from a
legitimate vehicle is given by
Yi = Ui +Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (3)
where Xi, the BS’s receiver thermal noise, is a zero-mean
normal random variable with variance σ2T . Ui is the ToA
and is given by
Ui =
dci
c
, (4)
where dci is the Euclidian distance of i-th BS to a legitimate
vehicle’s true location, and is given by
dci =
√
(xc − xi)2 + (yc − yi)2,
with c as the speed of light.
We assume the measurements made by the N BSs to be
independent of each other. Under Ho, they collectively form
a vector Y = [Y 1, Y2, . . . , YN ]
T . Vector Y follows a multi-
variate normal distribution given as
Y|Ho ∼ N (U ,R), (5)
where U = [U1, U2, . . . , UN ]
T is the mean vector under
the null hypothesis, and R = σ2T IN is the covariance matrix.
Under H1, a malicious vehicle claims to be at a location
removed from its true location. In a real-world scenario, we
can think of this as if the malicious vehicle pretends to be
on the road when he actually is placed off the road in a
street or in a building. The ToA value measured by the i-th
verifier from a malicious vehicle is given by
Yi = Tx +Wi +Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (6)
where Tx is a time bias potentially added by malicious
vehicle which impacts the overall ToA value. Wi is given
by
Wi =
dti
c
, (7)
where dti is the Euclidian distance of i-th BS to a malicious
vehicle’s true location, and is given by
dti =
√
(xt − xi)2 + (yt − yi)2.
We assume the measurements made by N BSs to be indepen-
dent of each other. Under H1, they collectively form a vector
Y = [Y 1, Y2, . . . , YN ]
T . Vector Y follows a multi-variate
normal distribution given as
Y|H1 ∼ N (W + Tx1,R), (8)
where W +Tx1 = [W1 +Tx,W2 +Tx, . . . ,WN +Tx]T and
1 is a vector equal to the length of the number of BSs N
with all its elements set to 1. For later convenience we set
V = W + Tx1 and rewrite (8) as
Y|H1 ∼ N (V ,R). (9)
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The outcome of an LVS is a binary result, i.e., legitimate
or malicious. This is different from a localization system
where the output is an estimated location. We measure the
performance of our LVS using two methodologies; through
information-theoretic analysis followed in [27] and, through
the newly designed NN method which makes use of the
machine-learning techniques. In both cases, a Bayes average
cost function is chosen as the performance metric for LVS in
terms of the ‘Total Error’. The information-theoretic method
is based on the a-priori assumption that the proportion of
malicious vehicles is known. Usually this is set to 0.5 in
the absence of any other information. On the other hand, the
NN-LVS calculates the Total Error irrespective of any such
a-priori assumption and it can function with any proportion
of malicious vehicles in the field. The Total Error is given
by
ξ = p(Ho)α + p(H1)(1− β), (10)
where p(Ho) and p(H1) are the a priori probabilities of
occurrences of Ho (i.e., legitimate vehicle) and H1 (i.e.,
malicious vehicle), respectively, and are set equal, i.e., 0.5.
α represents the false positive rate (the rate of legitimate
vehicles being detected incorrectly) and β represents the
detection rate (the rate of malicious vehicles being detected
correctly). Equation (10) then takes the form
ξ = 0.5α + 0.5 (1−β) . (11)
A. LVS Performance Analysis Using Information Theory
The Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) is used for performance
measurement of the LVS. It has been proven earlier that
the LRT achieves the optimum detection results for a given
false positive rate [30]. This leads to the conclusion that the
LRT minimizes the Total Error and maximizes the mutual
information between input and output of LVS [31]. We follow
the decision rule below for the LRT
Λ (Y ) , p(Y |H1)
p(Y |Ho)
D1
≥
<
D0
λ, (12)
where Λ (Y ) is the likelihood ratio, λ is the decision thresh-
old, and D1 and D0 are the binary decision values (i.e.,
whether the vehicle is legitimate or malicious). Given the
multi-variate normal form of the observations, (12) can be
reformulated as
Λ (Y ) =
e−
1
2 (Y −V )T R−1 (Y−V )
e−
1
2 (Y −U)T R−1 (Y−U)
D1
≥
<
D0
λ. (13)
B. LVS Performance Analysis Using Neural Networks
This section highlights the novel approach used to design
a classification framework for the verification of a vehicle’s
claimed location through supervised machine-learning tech-
niques. The framework uses a multi-layer feed-forward NN
for the binary classification of a vehicle as either legitimate
or malicious.
For uniformity, the framework considers the same inputs
as considered for the information-theoretic method. These
inputs include the ToA of the signal based on the user’s
claimed location, andY (the observation vector influenced by
the thermal noise Xi). Based on a series of trials with chang-
ing architectures for the NN-LVS, we finalised a framework
that has an input vector, a hidden layer (with 10 neurons),
and a binary output layer as shown in Fig. 1. The NN
LVS achieved optimum performance through the use of a
Hyperbolic tangent sigmoid, and linear transfer functions in
the hidden, and output layers, respectively.
Fig. 1. The architecture of the Neural Network (NN) used for Location
Verification in this work. This architecture arose from many trials of biased
timings using different architectures with varying numbers of layers.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present some numerical results based on our
analysis from the information-theoretic and NN-based LVS.
In carrying out these simulations, BSs are located in a 1000
meters by 500 meters area at fixed publicly known locations.
This area closely resembles a small district of a city and
corresponds to the context of ITS where the BSs are trusted
verifiers located on the roadside or in the nearby parking
lots. The claimant vehicle (the prover whose location is yet
to be verified) resides in a 500 X 500 meters area in between
the BSs. In order to simulate the attacking scenario and
thus study the performance of both the LVS, we assume
there are two claimants that are within the communication
range, namely a legitimate vehicle which is reporting its
true location to the BSs and a malicious vehicle which is
performing the location-spoofing attack. Both the vehicles
can overhear the communication between the BSs and thus
both acquire the locations of the BSs. If malicious, the vehicle
can also overhear the communication between legitimate
vehicles and the BSs so that it can forge its claimed location
to that of the legitimate vehicle’s true location.
The malicious vehicle sets its true location at a far-off point
so that its transmitted signal (with the appropriate timing
offset) has equal ToA at all the BSs (in the limit of the
true location of a malicious vehicle being much greater that
any other scale all NLoS biases at all BSs are the same).
Under this approximation the mean ToA at the BSs is just
the mean of the timings anticipated from a vehicle at the
claimed location. The resultant alteration in ToA due to
the receiver’s thermal noise is extracted from a Gaussian
random distribution with fixed standard deviation. The value
of standard deviation considered in our simulation is set to
300 nanoseconds.
We use simulated ToA data in our numerical experiments.
The claimed locations for genuine and malicious vehicles in
equal proportion are generated randomly in the specified area.
The ToA from the claimed locations at the 4 BSs is calculated
using equation (4). The receivers in the BSs are under the
influence of independent thermal noise Xi and thus the ToA
measurements they make have a certain degree of variation.
We extract this variation (in nanoseconds) from a Gaussian
random function that has a fixed standard deviation. The area
around the vehicles is non LoS and therefore their transmitted
signal cannot reach the BSs directly and hence their ToA
have an additional NLoS bias φi in them. To mimic reality,
we extract φi from an exponential distribution as given below
f(φi) = ρie
−ρiφi , (14)
where ρi is the scale parameter.
For the information-theoretic LVS, we calculate the Total
Error, the false positive rate, and the detection rate using
equations (11) and (13), respectively.
The data considered for the information-theoretic LVS
analysis is used to also train the NN-LVS. We call this data
the training data.1 In the training phase, we feed the NN-LVS
with random vehicles data at a speed of one vehicle data
per second. During each second the NN-LVS is trained with
the available training data. The backpropagation algorithm
has a set of internal parameters to terminate the training
phase for the NN-LVS. We observe that in most of the cases
the maximum validation failures; which is the maximum
number of iterations in a row during which the NN-LVS’s
performance fails to improve or remains the same, terminates
the training phase. We set this parameter to 6. The weights
and biases are considered as optimised once the training
phase has concluded. The NN-LVS afterwards can be used
to classify a vehicle as genuine or malicious in the test data2.
The NN-LVS is trained during the 1st second with an input
training data from a single random vehicle. At the end of 1st
second, we subject the NN-LVS (with its weights and biases
optimized) to calculate a Total Error for the test data. In
the 2nd second, we add another random vehicle training data
to the previously available single vehicle training data. The
combined data forms a new training data set which is used to
retrain the NN-LVS (from 1st second). After a re-training, the
NN-LVS is used to calculate a new Total Error for the test
data. We add yet another random vehicle training data to the
previously available training data in the 3rd second and use
the updated data set to once again train the NN-LVS. At the
end of the third second a revised Total Error is calculated for
the test data. This process of updating the training data set,
retraining the NN-LVS and recalculating a new Total Error
1By training data we mean ToA data received from vehicles who we know
a priori to be legitimate or malicious. Use of such data in order to set the
neural network parameters, prior to its use on ‘unlabeled’ data (i.e., data
from vehicles who we do not know a priori to be legitimate or malicious),
is known as the training phase.
2The test data is simulated under a different realization with same settings
as training data. Further, the test data has no labels.
Fig. 2. Total Error performance of the NN-LVS with 4 BSs as it is being
trained under changing NLoS bias conditions. The training and the testing
data has genuine and malicious vehicles in equal proportions. Xi (extracted
from a Gaussian random distribution) and NLoS bias (extracted from an
exponential distribution and shown by different colour of the curves) both
have a fixed standard deviation of 300 nanoseconds. The NN-LVS indicates
an improved performance with a Total Error of 0.10 (NLoS 300ns), 0.06
(NLoS 500ns) and 0.04 (NLoS 700ns) as compared to the LRT method of
[27] which gives a Total Error of 0.16 (NLoS 300ns), 0.18 (NLoS 500ns)
and 0.21 (NLoS 700ns). Higher NLoS leads to easier discrimination between
a genuine vehicle and a malicious one placed far from the BSs.
for the test data continues in the following seconds. The Total
Error keeps on decreasing with the passage of time.
In Fig. 2 we initially calculate the Total Error for a data set
that has genuine and malicious vehicles in equal proportions
(Po= 0.5). The standard deviation for Xi (extracted from a
Gaussian distribution) is 300 nanoseconds while the standard
deviation for NLoS bias (extracted from an exponential
distribution) is indicated by the different curves. The number
of BSs used is 4. The LRT (i.e., the Total Error arising from
the information-theoretic LVS) corresponding to each NLoS
curve is indicated by the dashed arrow lines. We can see that
performance for the information-theoretic LVS deteriorates
as the NLoS bias increases while the performance for the
NN-LVS improves with an increase in the NLoS bias in the
ToA data. It is clear that the NN-LVS is able to accommodate
the NLoS conditions significantly better than an information-
theoretic LVS.
Next, we study the impact of changing Po (the proportion
of malicious vehicles) over the performance of LVS. We train
a NN-LVS through similar procedures as described earlier
but change the proportion of malicious vehicles in the test
data. In one of the experiments, we fix the standard deviation
for Xi and the NLoS bias both to 300 nanoseconds. The
number of BSs are 4. We can see in Fig. 3 that NN-LVS
performs consistently even when Po is different in the test
data. We can see that NN-LVS performance is satisfactory
even when the test data has 99.95% genuine vehicles and
0.05% malicious vehicles. The red line in the Fig. 3 shows
the Total Error for the information-theoretic LVS when the
Fig. 3. Total Error performance of the NN-LVS with 4 BSs. The test data
has different proportions for genuine and malicious vehicles as highlighted
by the different colour of curves. Xi is extracted from a Gaussian random
distribution with a standard deviation of 300 nanoseconds. The NLoS bias
is extracted from an exponential distribution with a fixed standard deviation
of 300 nanoseconds. The red line shows the Total Error for the information-
theoretic LVS (based on LRT method) for a data (realised under same
settings of standard deviation for Xi and NLoS bias) which has a Po equal
to 0.5. We can see that the NN-LVS performs consistently with different
Po(s) in the test data.
genuine and malicious vehicles are in equal proportions in the
data (with no changes to Xi and NLoS bias). Our study shows
that unlike the information-theoretic LVS whose performance
is conditioned to the a-priori knowledge of Po, the NN-LVS’s
performance is largely independent of Po.
In Fig. 4, we change the standard deviation for NLoS
bias to 500 nanoseconds. Xi still is extracted from a Gaus-
sian random distribution with a standard deviation of 300
nanoseconds. We can observe that NN-LVS’s performance is
independent of the Po value.
In Fig. 5, we change number of BSs to 6 while the standard
deviation for NLoS bias and Xi are kept the same as in Fig. 4.
Still we can see a promising performance from the NN-LVS
under different Po(s).
In another work, we also analyzed the performance of the
NN-LVS proposed here by subjecting it to a real-world exper-
imental situation where measured Received Signal Strength
(RSS) inputs were used instead of simulated ToA values
[32]. The RSS from the vehicle was measured at 3 BSs.
The performance results for the NN-LVS using input RSS
measurements were consistent with the claims of this work,
showing our NN-LVS’s adaptability to other metrics beyond
ToA.
The NN-LVS framework proposed in this work can be
applied to many sub-applications within IoT and 5G whose
performance largely depends on the true and verified loca-
tions of users. Map services, smart parking, Massive MIMO,
Enhanced beamforming, coverage enrichment, and interfer-
ence mitigation are just a few of the applications which
can benefit from a NN-LVS. The same framework can also
Fig. 4. Total Error performance of the NN-LVS as in Fig. 3 except the
standard deviation for NLoS bias now is 500 nanoseconds.
Fig. 5. Total Error performance of the NN-LVS as in Fig. 4 except the
number of BSs now are 6.
assist in defence-related operations where location and its
verification is of prime importance.
V. FUTURE WORK
We aim to add more prominent features related to the chan-
nel environment so as to further investigate gains achieved
by NN-based LVSs. These additional features will better
describe the real-world channels. We also plan to compliment
ToA systems by adding RSS and Angle of Arrival (AoA)
measurements thus enhancing the reliability of NN-based
LVSs. A combination of ToA, RSS and AoA will make
the NN LVS even more reliable and efficient in its location
verification. We also plan to extend the NN framework to
more complex channel fading models such as Rician fading
channels. Estimating channel parameters through machine-
learning will also result in an extended performance for the
NN LVS. In this case the neural network architecture will
need to be extended so as to accommodate the additional
unknowns that must be learned.
VI. CONCLUSION
Information-theoretic LVS frameworks, due to their op-
erating limitations, are not practical in many real-world
scenarios. To address this gap, we have proposed the use
of a neural network approach to location verification. This
approach is particulary useful when we consider that one of
the key inputs to any LVS is knowledge on the proportion
of vehicles anticipated to be malicious - an input usually
unknown. Using simulated ToA data, we have shown how
a NN-based LVS outperforms a state-of-the-art information-
theoretic LVS. Unlike the information-theoretic LVS, the
working of the NN-LVS is shown to be largely independent
of the proportion of malicious vehicles in the area. Unknown
channel conditions, such as NLoS bias effects, were also
shown to be better accommodated by the NN-LVS approach.
More salient real-world channel features, will be con-
sidered in our future work to further improve the overall
system performance. This will help us develop a more robust
state-of-the-art artificially intelligent LVS, an LVS which
will be wholly practical in terms of its location verification
performance in a wide range of future wireless networks
beyond the ITS we have studied here. We believe the novel
approach for enhancing the performance of real-world LVSs
that we have developed here potentially forms the foundation
for all future works in this important area.
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